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Abstract
For purposes of this analysis, “civil commitment” is a form of noncriminal
confinement for those who are legally found to be mentally
ill.1 With the minor exception of rare confinement for some communicable
diseases, there is no analogue of involuntary commitment for
physical illness.
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For purposes of this analysis, "civil commitment" is a form of noncriminal confinement for those who are legally found to be mentally
ill.1 With the minor exception of rare confinement for some communicable diseases, there is no analogue of involuntary commitment for
physical illness.
Florida's civil commitment system, the "Baker Act, ' 2 is inneed of
change because it has not kept pace with legal developments of recent
years. To the extent developments in the law occur conservatively, and
to the extent these developments could not have occurred without a
consensus of professional and social opinion, it is also fair to say the
Baker Act has not kept pace with developments in the mental health
disciplines.
The changes in the Baker Act proposed here (see Appendix) are
the product of comparison with a nationally circulated model act, the
* Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Research Associate of the
Community Mental Health Research Center, Florida State University; J.D. American
University, 1973; A.B. Harvard University, 1970.
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of Tom Dye, former Director of
the Policy Sciences Program; the research assistance of Robert Beitler, Steven Burwell
and Clifford Nilson; the consultation of Robert Pass of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emannuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, Florida; and the encouragement of Kent Miller.
1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222-23 (5th ed. 1979). See also T. SZASZ,
LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL

HEALTH PRACTICES 39 (1963): "Commitment is compulsory or involuntary detention
of a person in an institution designated as a mental hospital."
The civil liberties subfield of mental health policy analysis has certain areas of
unexpected inattention: "for example, the problems posed by trying to 'treat' or 'help'
people through the rehabilitative model (including problems of mental commitment,
psychosurgery, and chemotherapy) appear not to have become grist for the scholarly
mill (but see The Civil Liberties Review)." CIVIL LIBERTIES POLICY AND POLICY
MAKING ix-x (S. Wasby ed. 1977).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 394.451-.481 (1981).
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Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment, 3 and consideration of such
recommendations as the Report of the President's Commission on
Mental Health.4 The author's original intent was to draft a new mental
health act as a substitute for the Baker Act, using the Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment. Upon analysis, however, the Suggested Statute is quite verbose and difficult to follow. In addition, the Baker Act
already has several features of the Suggested Statute. Thus, the proposed changes to the Baker Act constitute improvements from the Suggested Statute added to the existing Florida civil commitment structure
and language, without changing either the basic structure or words.
The comparison Suggested Statutes on Civil Commitment is part
of a project suggested by the Mental Health Association involving the
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and the Mental Health
Law project (the leading multidisciplinary, mental disability law, public interest firm in the country) to prepare analyses and suggested
model statutes on such state mental health care issues as civil commitment. 5 During drafting, the Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment
was reviewed and critiqued by a broadly representative, sixteen person,
national interdisciplinary advisory panel, and by more than seventy
other national mental health professionals, professional and consumer
groups, lawyers, judges, and law professors.6
During the 1979 legislative session in Florida, the Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment was endorsed by such organizations as the
Florida Mental Health Association, the National Association of Social
Workers, the Florida Center for Children and Youth, and the District
Two Human Rights Advocacy Committee for Florida State Hospital.,

3. See American Bar Association Commission on the Mentally Disabled, 2
L. REP. 57, 129-59 (1977). [hereinafter cited as MENTAL DISA-

MENTAL DISABILITY
BILITY L. REP.].

4.

REPORT OF THE TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES TO PRESIDENT'S

IV, App. (1978).
5. The other issues covered are: mental health advocacy service; mental health
standards and human rights; zoning for community residences; therapeutic confidentiality (including electronic data processing); guardianship; mental health treatment for
COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, Vol.

minors; right to education; state imposed disabilities; discrimination; incompetence to
stand trial on criminal charges; insanity defense; and, mental health treatment for
prisoners.
6. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 61.
7. FLA. STAT. § 20.19(7) (1981), a third-party mechanism for protecting consti-
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Despite widespread opinion that the Baker Act had not kept pace
with national developments expressed in judicial decisions, legislative
changes, and mental health care, the Florida legislature has not addressed the Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment, primarily because
it is difficult to identify the differences between the Baker Act and the
lengthy Suggested Statute. The Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment is twenty-eight pages long, including annotations; the introductory analysis is forty-nine pages long. In contrast, the Baker Act fills
only eleven pages in the statute book, and includes issues addressed
separately in the Suggested Statutes on Mental Health Standards and
Human Rights (ten pages), 8 Procedures for Voluntary Treatment (four
pages), 9 and Mental Health Treatment for Minors (ten pages). 10
In late March 1981, changes to the Baker Act proposed here (Appendix A) were unanimously endorsed by both the Board of Governors
for the Florida Bar and, in principle, by the Mental Health Association
Board of Directors for the Florida Mental Health Association. These
proposed changes to the Baker Act represent a distillation of an item
by item comparison to the Suggested Statutes. The changes are not
exhaustive; they cover those areas most needing amendment. The
changes also attempt to be politically realistic. For example, the following proposals, however desirable, were omitted: jury trial; 1 protection
from being a witness against oneself;1 2 "beyond a reasonable doubt" or
tutional and human rights of clients.
8. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 291.
9. Id. at 329.
10. Id. at 459.
11. See, e.g., Note, Confinement of Mabel Jones: Is There a Right to Jury Trial
in Civil Commitment Proceedings?,6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 103 (1978). Seventeen jurisdictions (Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) have a right to a jury trial in civil commitment as of
November, 1978. 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 205, 206-14 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Aronson, Should the PrivilegeAgainst Self-IncriminationApply to
Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1973); Fielding, Compulsory PsychiatricExamination in Civil Commitment and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 117 (1973); Wesson, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Commitment Proceedings, WIS. L. REV. 697, (1980); Comment,
Defective Delinquent Commitment Proceedings and the Constitution: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Counsel at the Examination Stage, 22
AM. U.L. REV. 619 (1973).

Published by NSUWorks, 1982

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 9
388

Nova Law Journal

6:1982 1

"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" as a standard of proof.13
Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 447 U.S. 934 (1981). (Prosecution's use of psychiatric testimony at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial to establish future dangerousness violated respondent's constitutional rights to fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination and sixth amendment right to counsel, where respondent was not
apprised of his rights and did not knowingly decide to waive them when faced while in
custody with a court-ordered psychiatric inquiry, and where respondent was not given
prior opportunity to consult with counsel to decide whether to submit to psychiatric
examination).
13. Fifteen jurisdictions (California, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin) require proof "beyond a reasonable doubt"
in civil commitment proceedings; two states (Oklahoma and Tennessee) require "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence; and three states (North Carolina, Washington,
and West Virginia) require "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence. The other states,
including Florida, merely require "clear and convincing" evidence for an individual to
be involuntarily committed to a mental institution.
The standard of proof needed to involuntarily commit an individual to a state
mental hospital for an indefinite period has been established by the United States Supreme Court to be at least "clear and convincing" evidence. Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979). Whatever standard of proof is required under state law, if the standard does not "inform the factfinder that the proof must be greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases," due process
demands are not met. Id. at 433. If the required standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt," or an equivalent, such as "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence,
their is serious question that the state should be able to prove anyone to be both mentally ill and dangerous. See Greenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 227, 266-67 (1974); Note, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1291 (1968); Note,
Due Process and the Development of "Criminal" Safeguards in Civil Commitment
Adjudications, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 624 (1974).
Chief Justice Burger's lack of consistency in mental disability law decisions
emerges in Addington and has not gone unnoticed. See Shuman, Warren Burger and
the Civil Commitment Tetralogy, 3 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 155 (1980). In Addington, the Chief Justice introduced the idea that an individual's interest in liberty includes not only physical liberty, but also mental freedom: a "free to be free" consideration for involuntary commitment. 441 U.S. at 429 (citing Chodoff, The Case for
Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496, 498
(1976); Schwartz, Myers & Astrachan, PsychiatricLabeling and the Rehabilitationof
the Mental Patient, 31 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 329, 335 (1974)). He used these ref-

erences, provided by Joel Klein, counsel for the American Psychiatric Association, as
amicus curiae, to reach the value judgment that unlike the criminal justice system,
"[i]t cannot be said, therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to 'go
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This article reviews the proposed changes in the Baker Act issue
by issue. The justification for each proposed change will be presented
with respect to legal developments and, where appropriate, developments in mental health disciplines.

Definition of "Mentally Ill"
In Florida, the current definition of "mentally ill" is "having a
mental, emotional, or behavioral disorder which substantially impairs
the person's mental health.""' Circular and tautological, this definition
identifies mental illness as an absence of mental health, without definfree' than for a mentally normal person to be committed." 441 U.S. at 429. See Brief
for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, in P. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 297, 303 (1979). Ironically, Klein, former
clerk to Justice Powell and former attorney with the Mental Health Law Project (the
Project provided counsel for appellant Addington), is reported to have been involved
with Justice Stewart's clerks in formulating the following response to Chief Justice
Burger's statement in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1965), ("There can be
little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a state may confine individuals solely
to protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or communicable disease." Id. at 582-83):
May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them a living
standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community?. . .[T]he
mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while the State
may arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarcertation is
rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living standards of those
capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of
family or friends. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-490.
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its
citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as
well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are
physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.
Id. at 575. See B.

WOODWARD

& S.

ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SU-

370, 373-74, 376-77,(1979).
For a review of what, in civil commitment, must be proved by at least "clear and
convincing" evidence, see A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM 1980 SUPPLEMENT 127-28 (1980).
14. FLA. STAT. § 394.455(3) (1981). This definition was amended during the
1982 legislative session, while this article was in publication. See infra note 16.
PREME COURT
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ing mental health.

"Mentally ill" is a legal definition; it is one of the criteria for civil
commitment. As a legal definition, it should give notice of those circumstances under which a person can be deprived of his freedom. The
current definition of "mentally ill" has so far withstood constitutional
challenge for vagueness because statutorily" it must be read in conjunction with the other criteria for commitment (e.g., likely to injure
17
others, or likely to injure self). 16 Some courts, such as Pennsylvania's,

have found even better definitions of mental illness18 to be unconstitu15.
16.

FLA. STAT. § 394.463(2)(a) (1981).
See In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977). The definition enacted in 1982

is:
an impairment of the emotional processes, of the ability to exercise conscious control of one's actions, or of the ability to perceive reality or to
understand, which impairment substantially interferes with a person's ability to meet the ordinary demands of living, regardless of etiology, except
that, for the purposes of this act, the term does not include retardation or
developmental disability as defined in chapter 393, simple intoxication, or
conditions manifested only by antisocial behavior or drug addiction.
FLA. STAT. § 394.455(3)(effective July 1, 1982). While this definition is substantially
similar to the one here proposed, the 1982 changes in the Baker Act fell far short of
those needed.
17. Finken v. Roop, 233 Pa. Super. 762, 339 A.2d 764 (1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 960 (1976). See Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Md. 1979) (medical
concept of mental illness insufficient, legal definition should be relied upon in taking
personal liberty); Bell v. Wayne County Gen'l Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich.
1974).

Compare, e.g.,

MICH. COMp. LAws ANN.

§ 330.1400a (1980): "'mental illness'

means a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life"; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.01(13)(b) (1981): "Mental illness, for purposes of involuntary commitment, means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life, but does not incldue alcoholism."
These are examples of new legal definitions for mental illness accepted by state legislatures in response to successful litigation against older definitions. They are similar to
the definition of mental illness for Florida proposed here.

18. The unconstitutionally vague Pennsylvania definition specified mental illness
that "so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control; judgment
and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary
or advisable for him to be under care." 339 A.2d at 775 n.14 (quoting section 201 of
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 codified in 50
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tionally vague for failure to give fair warning of legally proscribed conduct, or to set a standard for restricting governmental discretion. The
current Florida definition may be subject to more successful constitutional challenge in the future.
The proposed definition now substantially enacted, is as follows:
"Mentally ill" means a substantial impairment of emotional
processes, ability to exercise conscious control of one's actions or
ability to perceive reality or to reason or understand, which impairment is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior; it
does not include retardation or developmental disability as defined
in Chapter 393, brief periods of intoxication caused by substances
such as alcohol or drugs, or dependence upon or addiction to any
substance such as alcohol or drugs.
This definition limits legal involvement to situations of major mental
impairment. The definition covers the three aspects of mental functioning (emotion, volition and cognition) in words understandable to lay
persons, judges and attorneys, and mental health professionals.1 9 It prevents mental health professionals from usurping judicial responsibility
for determining the circumstances under which persons can be deprived
of liberty. The definition excludes mental retardation, developmental
disability, intoxication, and dependence or addiction to such substances
as alcohol or drugs. These conditions are addressed by other statutes
and programs in Florida.20
The definition is comparatively conservative. There is substantial
psychiatric literature 21 supporting the position that mental illness is a
PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 4102 (1966)).

19. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 89. See Keiter, A ConstitutionalAnalysis
of Involuntary Civil Commitment in Wyoming, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 141, 158
& 160 (1980) (statutory definitions of mental illness are frequently circular or ambiguous and fail to give the term any context; behavioral definition should be used); Note,
Involuntary Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The Failureof the 1975 Legislation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1284, 1373, 1428 (1979) (Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment definition of mental illness is specifically recommended).
20. FLA. STAT. §§ 393.061-.20 (1981) deals with developmental disabilities; FLA.
STAT. §§ 396.012-.171 (1981), alcoholism; FLA. STAT. §§ 397.011-.20 (1981) drug
dependency.
21. See, e.g., D. COOPER, PSYCHIATRY AND ANTI-PSYCHIATRY (1967); R.
GEERTSMA, CLINICAL ASSESSMENT IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
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theory for identifying behavior or thought processes which we do not

S.

HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMA OF CRIME

CURRENT APPROACHES TO PSYCHOANALYSIS

PUNISHMENT

117-18, 130 (1968); P.

MAN, THE FUTURE OF PSYCHIATRY

(1960); K.

36, 219 (1967); L.

ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND

247 (1962); T.

HOHMAN,

MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF

(1958); T.

ROTH-

SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL:

A

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1966); THE MEDICAL MODEL OF MENTAL ILLNESS (S.L.
Sharma ed. 1970); T. SZASZ, supra note 1; T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS:

(1961); Agnew & Bannister, Psychiatric Diagnosis as a Pseudo-Specialist Language, 46 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCH. 69
(1973); Albee, Models, Myths, and Manpower, 52 MENTAL HYGIENE 168 (Apr.
1968); Ausebel, Relationships Between Psychology and Psychiatry: The Hidden Issues, in CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN TRANSITION (J. Braur ed. 1966); Baur, Legal Responsibility and Mental Illness, 57 Nw. L. REV. 12, 14 (1962); Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 CATH. U. L. REV. 25 (1955); Coles, The Limits
of Psychiatry, 31 THE PROGRESSIVE 32 (May 1967); Davidson, The Semantics of Psychotherapy, 115 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 410 (1958); Davidson, Point of View, 52 MENTAL
HYGIENE 5 (1967); Eysenek, The Outcome Problem in Psychotherapy, THE INVESTIGATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (A. Goldstein ed. 1966); Furrow, Defective Mental Treatment: A Proposalfor the Application of Strict Liability to Psychiatric Services, 58
B.U.L. REV. 391 (1978); Goldstein, The Fitness Factory Part I: The Psychiatrist's
Role in Determining Competency, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1144, 1147 (1973); Guiora
& Harrison, What is Psychiatry?A New Model of Service and Education, 130 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1275, 1275 (1973); Halleck, The Psychiatrist and the Legal Process, 2
PSYCHIATRY TODAY 24 (1969); Jackson, 20 STAN. MED. BULL. 202 (1962); Kaschak,
Therapist and Client: Two Views of the Process and Outcome of Psychotherapy,
PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 271 (May 1978); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968); Mariner, A Critical
Look at Professional Education in the Mental Health Field, 22 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
271 (1967); McReynolds, DSM-III and the Future of Applied Social Science, PROF.
PSYCHOLOGY 123, 125 (Feb. 1979); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An
Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978); Pugh, The Insanity
Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham and Brawner, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 87, 104; Robitscher, The New Face of Legal Psychiatry, 129 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 91 (1972); Roche, Symposium on Criminal Responsibility and Mental
Disease: Medical Aspects, 25 TENN. L. REV. 221 (1959); Salzman, ChangingStyles in
Psychiatric Syndromes: Historical Overview, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 147 (1973);
Sarbin & Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise: Attitude of the Public Toward
Mental Illness, 35 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 159 (1970); Sarbin &
Mancuso, Paradigms and Moral Judgments: Improper Conduct is not Disease, 39 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 6, 7 (1972); Shah, Crime and Mental Illness:
Some Problems in Defining and Labeling Deviant Behavior, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 21
(1969); Shepherd, A Critical Appraisalof Contemporary Psychiatry, 12 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 302, 304, 312 (1971); Strupp & Hadley, A Tripartite Model of
FOUNDATION OF A THEORY OF NORMAL CONDUCT
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understand, rather than a disease susceptible to diagnosis and treatment in the same manner as physical illness. Indeed, the problems of
defining and classifying these conditions remain an ongoing issue. The
new Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM111)22 favors the use of the general term "mental disorder" over
"mental illness" or "mental disease." More specific classification of the
disorder may vary with the individual making the classification. The
results of field studies conducted to determine the reliability and correlation of classifications done by different individual raters under the
new "multiaxial system" are given in the manual;23 they show good
Mental Health and Therapeutic Outcomes with Special Reference to Negative Effects
in Psychotherapy, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 187 (1977); Tarrier, The Future of the Medical Model, a Reply to Guze, An Editorial,167 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 71
(1979); Taylor & Heiser, Phenomenology: An Alternative Approach to Diagnosis of
Mental Disease, 12 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 480 (1972); Tuma, May, Yale &
Forsythe, Therapist's Experience, General ClinicalAbility and Treatment Outcome in
Schizophrenia, 46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 1120 (1978); Van Praag,
The Position of Biological Psychiatry Among the PsychiatricDisciplines, 12 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 1 (1961); Wooten, Academic Lecture: The Place of Psychiatry
and Medical Concepts in the Treatment of Offenders, 17 CAN. PYSCHIATRIC A.J. 365
(1972) "[lIt is time to admit that the sick and the wicked are not scientifically distinguishable . .. ."Id. at 371.
But see, e.g., M. SIEGLER & H. OSMOND, MODELS OF MADNESS, MODELS OF

(1976); Ausubel, PersonalityDisorderis Disease, 16 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 69
(1971); Guze, The Future of Psychiatry: Medicine or Social Science? An Editorial,
165 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE, 225 (1977); Paris, DiagnosisBefore Treatment,
20 CAN. PSYCHIATRIC J. 305 (1975); Reiss, A Critiqueof Thomas S. Szasz' 'Myth of
Mental Illness,' 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1081 (1972); Shagrass, EditorialBook Review, 164 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 380 (1977).
See generally A. FLEW, CRIME OR DISEASE? (1974); Boorse, On the Distinction
Between Disease and Illness, 5 PHILOS. & PUB. AFFAIRS 49 (1975); Coryell & Wetell,
Attitudes Towards Issues in Psychiatry Among Third Year Residents: A BriefSurvey,
135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 732 (1978); Houlgate, Rights, Health and Mental Disease,22
WAYNE L. REV. 87 (1975); Kety, From Rationalization to Reason, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 957 (1974); Macklin, Mental Health and Mental Illness: Some Problems of
Definition and Concept Formation, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW (J. Humber
& R. Almeder eds. 1976); Moore, Some Myths About "Mental Illness", 32 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1483 (1975); Shuman, The Right to be Unhealthy, 22 WAYNE L.
REV. 61 (1975).
MEDICINE

22. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980).

23.

Id. at Appendix F.
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reliability. However, the extent to which this favorable reliability is dependent upon a statistic called the "kappa coefficient" renders the proffered reliability questionable. 4 Other criticisms cite additional substantive deficiencies in the manual. 25 This is only to suggest that DSMIII is no panacea to the problems of definition of the term "mentally
24.

See, e.g., J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TES-

TIMONY 138-41 (3d ed. 1981), (citing Cohen, Weighted Kappa: Nominal Scale Agreement with Provision for Scaled Disagreement or Partial Credit, 70 PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULL. 213 (1968)); Fleiss, Spitzer, Endicott & Cohen, Quantification of Agreement
and Multiple Psychiatric Diagnosis, 26 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 168 (1972);
Helzer, Robins, Taibleson, Woodruff, Reich & Wish, Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 34 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 129 (1977); Janes, Agreement Measurement
and the Judgment Process, 167 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 343 (1979); Spitzer,
Cohen, Fleiss & Endicott, Quantification of Agreement in Psychiatric Diagnosis, 17
ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 83 (1967); Spitzer & Fleiss, A Re-analysis of the
Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnosis, 125 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 341 (1974).
25. E.g., McLemore & Benjamin, Whatever Happened to InterpersonalDiagnosis? A Psycho-social Alternative to DSM-III, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 17 (1979); McReynolds, supra note 21; Schacht & Nathan, But Is It Good for the Psychologist?
Appraisal and Status of DSM-II, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1017 (1977); Zubin, But Is
It Good for Science?, 31 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST 1 (1977-1978).
Newmark noted that preliminary drafts of DSM-III were beseiged by criticism
concerning lack of specificity in the definition of terms defining schizophrenia. Newmark, Konanc, Simpson, Boren & Prillaman, Predictive Validity of the Rorschach
Prognostic Rating Scale with Schizophrenic Patients, 167 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 135 (1979). The ultimate value of DSM-III awaits use and tests for reliability
in the various categories, but recent studies continued to note the difficulty of defining
schizophrenia or determining appropriate diagnostic criteria. See, e.g., Newark, et al.,
MMPI Criteriafor Diagnosing Schizophrenia, 42 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 366
(1978); Newmark, et al., The Discriminative Value of the Whitaker Index of Schizophrenic Thinking, 42 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 636 (1978); Reade & Wertheimer,
A Bias in the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia, 44 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 878 (1976). Similarly, critical recent studies of depression have been available.
See, e.g., Endicott & Spitzer, Use of the Research Diagnostic Criteriaand the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophreia to Study Affective Disorders,136 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 52 (1979); Hirschfield & Klerman, PersonalityAttributes and Affective
Disorders, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 67 (1979); Klerman, Endicott, Spitzer, & Hirschfield, Neurotic Depressions: A Systematic Analysis of Multiple Criteria and Meanings, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 57 (1979); Owens & Maxmon, Mood and Affect: A
Semantic Confusion, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 97 (1979); Winokur, Behar,
Vanvalkenburg & Lowry, Is a Familial Definition of Depression Both Feasible and
Valid?, 166 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 764 (1978).
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ill."
The proposed definition should reduce inappropriate use of the
mental health system by emphasizing substantial mental impairments,
while excluding civil commitment for conditions such a retardation, developmental disability, intoxication, substance dependence, and addiction. The civil commitment process will be more efficient once mental
illness is more narrowly and appropriately defined.
Definition of "Likely to Injure Himself"
Currently, there is no statutory definition in Florida for "likely to
injure himself." The Florida Supreme Court stated in In re Beverly:
"In order to conclude that the person is likely to injure himself.

.

., the

judge must conclude that there is such a threat of harm as to comprehend the positive infliction of injury .

.

6

The proposed definition is as follows:
"Likely to injure himself" means that it is more likely than
not that in the near future the person will attempt to commit suicide or inflict serious bodily harm upon himself by violent or other
actively self-destructive means, as evidenced by behavior causing or
attempting the infliction of serious bodily harm upon himself within
twenty days prior to the initiation of the proceeding.
This definition, another part of the criteria for involuntary commitment, incorporates provisions requiring a showing of recent, overt, selfinjurious behavior.
With "likely to injure himself" now statutorily undefined in the
Baker Act, mental health professionals are left with the uncomfortable
and inappropriate discretion to do something, they cannot do: accurately and consistently predict dangerousness to self. Mental health
professionals predict dangerousness to self much more frequently than
self-injury actually occurs. One study indicated that psychiatric predictions of suicide would produce five erroneous commitments for every
person who might actually commit suicide. 7 Another researcher con26. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 487.
27. Greenland, Evaluation of Violence and DangerousBehavior Associated with
Mental Illness, 3 SEMINARS IN PSYCHIATRY 345, 354 (1971). See generally Under-
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cluded that highly accurate predictive tools are not even available for
such supposedly high risk populations as suicide attempters.28
The base rate for suicide is extremely low. Despite what one might
think from the media's portrayal, only about one percent of people attempting suicide actually succeed in killing themselves within one year
of the attempt.2 9 Identifying and helping the truly suicidal present
many problems. It has been proposed that a mental health professional
who could correctly identify four out of five potential suicides would
possibly erroneously hopitalize five individuals for every person who
might actually kill himself.30
The inability to predict suicide, and especially the broader behavior of self-injuriousness, is further complicated by the following considerations. Suicide is not necessarily a mentally disordered act. Suicide
may be an appropriate response to such circumstances as terminal illness, the loss of a loved one or extreme degradation. Thus, suicide can
be the product of conscious, rational decision-making, and may even
correlate with "mental health." 31 "Mental health professionals usually
cannot judge the rationality of a suicide attempt on any medical or
objective scale. They must rely, instead on their own subjective deter-

wood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and

Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979).
28. Murphy, Clinical Identification of Suicidal Risk, 27 ARCHIVES GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY 356, 357 (1972).
29. Greenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide, 49

N.Y.U.L. REv. 227, 239 (1974) and literature reviewed in Id. at 237-40.
30. Id. at 259-62 where Greenberg developed the following example. In a hypothetical medium sized city where 1,000 people survive a suicide attempt, ten will kill

themselves within the following year. If mental health profesionals were 80% efficient
in predicting suicide (80% correctly identified as suicides and nonsuicides, 20% misidentified), eight of the ten suicides will have been accurately identified, and only two
of the 794 [80% of (1000 minus eight)] predicted non-suicides will suicide. However,
only eight of the 206 (1000 minus 794) predicted suicides will suicide (4% accuracy).
This means that for every one person (4%) who will suicide committed as dangerous to
self, 24 people will be erroneously committed; for every ten truly suicidal persons correctly committed, 240 persons who would not suicide will be committed. In order for all
surviving suicide attempters to be appropriately at liberty, the prediction decisions of
mental health professionals should be 99% efficient because only one percent of suicide

attempters actually kill themselves within a year of the attempt.
31. Id. at 234-36 n.46; Note, Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of
the Mentally 1Il, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1227 n.141 (1974).
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mination of normal and abnormal responses to events, a function for
which they are not specially qualified by training or experience. ' 32 Except for obvious cases like slashed wrists, distinguishing suicidal behavior from other potentially self-destructive behavior is difficult. Smoking
cigarettes, racing cars or climbing mountains does not result in involuntary commitment, yet such behavior may be quite hazardous to self.
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson was told in 1954 that a return
to the Court following a heart attack would kill him. When he died five
days after returning to the bench, his choice was praised. 33
Unless Florida is prepared to engage in preventive detention for
alleged suicides, which would further exacerbate at enormous cost Florida's already high per capita rate of confinement, the statutory definition for "likely to injure himself" should require recent, overt, self-injurious behavior. The reported suicide rate for the United States in 1974
was one out of every 8500 persons.34 On the other hand, of those who
attempt suicide, the death rate reported has varied from one in seventy
to one in fifty.3 5 The recent overt behavior requirement will at least
reduce the extent to which the current civil commitment system inefficiently and unsuccessfully engages in pure speculation.
An argument can be made that the recent overt behavior requirement should not apply for continued involuntary commitments because
of the alleged "masking" effect.36 "Masking" is the artificial suppression of violence accomplished by a controlled institutional environment.
A short time period, e.g., twenty days within which overt behavior must
have occurred, enhances the validity of a dangerousness prediction; the
shorter the time period, the more accurate the prediction, and the
greater the reduction of erroneous. and inappropriate commitments.
This benefit should be weighed against the nominal impact of any socalled "masking effect." In the California experience, by permitting no

32.
33.
(1951).
34.

B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 51 (1978).
In Memoriam Mr. Justice Jackson, 349 U.S. XXVII, XXVIII-XXIX
2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 87.

35. Tuckman & Youngman, Identifying Suicide Risk Groups Among Attempted
Suicides. 78 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 763 (1963).
36. See People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 42, 581 P.2d 719 (1978)(en banc); Scopes v.
Shah, 59 A.D.2d 203, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911 (App. Div. 1977). These cases are critiqued
in a letter from Robert Pass to Winsor Schmidt (Sept. 25, 1980).
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more than two 14-day periods of involuntary commitment for suicidals,
fewer than one percent over a two-year period required the second 14day period, with none of them suiciding. This compares with a suicide
rate of three percent within six months for those committed for longer
periods under the previous statute.87 If commitment of suicidals
"masks" anything, it may mask the possible harm of commitment to
suicidals.
The requirement of recent, overt, self-injurious behavior in the
definition for "likely to injure himself" will effect statutorily what is
already constitutionally required by many courts"8 and widely endorsed
by commentators.8 9 The proposed definition will also reduce inappropriate and potentially harmful commitments and should enhance the

37.

See ENKI, A

STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW

(1969-

71) 152 (1972). Indeed, long periods of commitment may increase the rate of suicide
rather than decrease it. See Greenberg, supra note 29, at 236, 250, 256-59; Light,
Treating Suicide: The Illusions of a Professional Movement, 25 INT'L SOC. ScI. J.

475, 482-84 (1973); Pokorny, Myths About Suicide, SUICIDAL
AND MANAGEMENT (H. Resnick ed. 1968).

BEHAVIOR: DIAGNOSIS

38. See Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (D. Md. 1979); Bension v.
Meredith, 455 F. Supp. 662, 673 (D.D.C. 1978); Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106,
1110 (D. Hawaii 1977); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen.
Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.
Wis. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis.
1976); Finken v. Roop, 233 Pa. Super. 762, 339 A.2d 764 (1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 960 (1976).
But see United States ex rel. Matthew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill.
1978); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 515, 309 N.E. 733 (1974).
39. See, e.g., Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally Ill, 82 W. VA. L.
REV. 157, 205 (1979)(even an overt act is not enough without further explanation and
circumstances); Elliott, Proceduresfor Involuntary Commitment on the Basis of Alleged Mental Illness, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 231 (1970); Griffith & Griffith, Duty to
Third Parties,Dangerousness, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Problematic Concepts for Psychiatristand Lawyer, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 241 (1978); Keiter, supra note
19, at 161-62; Note, supra note 19, at 1376, 1384, 1431 (because of inaccuracy in
predicting dangerousness, the entire dangerousness standard from the Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment is recommended, including the requirement of a recent overt
act within the past 20 days); Note, Standardsfor Involuntary Civil Commitment in
Pennsylvania, 38 U. PITr. L. REV. 535 (1977). But see, e.g., Tanay, Law and the

Mentally Ill, 22

WAYNE

L.

REV.
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treatment of persons who are likely to injure themselves.
Definition of "Likely to Injure Others"
Florida's present statute does not define the term "likely to injure
others." The Florida Supreme Court attempted to fill the gap in In re
Beverly: "In order to conclude that the person is likely to injure...
others, the judge must conclude that there is such a threat of harm as
to comprehend the positive infliction of injury.
The proposed definition is as follows:
"Likely to injure others" means that it is more likely than not
that in the near future the person will inflict serious, unjustified
bodily harm on another person, as evidenced by behavior causing,
attempting or threatening such harm, including at least one incidence thereof within twenty days prior to the initiation of the
proceeding.
This definition for the police power criterion in civil commitment incorporates provisions requiring a showing of recent, overt, dangerous behavior to others.
Just as mental health professionals are unable to accurately and
consistently predict suicidal behavior, so too, are they unable' to predict
behavior that injures others. Psychiatrists overpredict violence; "for
every correct psychiatric prediction of violence, there are numerous erroneous predictions. ' 1 Pressure from the legal system is perceived as
too great for mental health professionals to do other than the "safe"
thing, i.e., predict dangerousness. 2
A dramatic illustration of the invalidity of predictions of violence
occurred in the aftermath of the United States Surpeme Court decision
40. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 487. The Florida Supreme Court elaborates:
"Ordinarily, this would refer to physical injury, but the judge may very well conclude
that the person is likely to inflict emotional injury to another. The statute contemplates
the latter as well as the former." Id.
41. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife that

Cuts Both Ways, 2

PHYCHIATRY TODAY

43 (Feb. 1969)(reviews existing prediction

studies).
42. Diamond, The PsychiatricPredictionof Dangerousness, 123 U.
439, 447 (1974).
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in Baxstrom v. Herold,4' regarding New York's maximum security forensic hospitals. The 969 allegedly "dangerous" mentally ill (criminally

insane) persons, detained in forensic facilities after expiration of their
prison terms, were ordered released or committed to civil facilities because the holdover detention was a constitutional violation. Despite the
original psychiatric determinations that inmates were mentally ill and
too dangerous to be released or even transferred to a civil hospital, one

year after the Supreme Court's order, 702 were in civil hospitals posing
no problems to the staff, 147 had been discharged into the community,
and only seven had to be returned to the forensic facility." Several
years later, 27% were living in the community, two were convicted of
felonies, seven of misdemeanors, and three percent were in maximum
security institutions."5

TRY

43. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
44. Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIA974, 976 (1968). The balance consisted of deaths (24), transfers (10), convales-

cents (62), and miscellaneous (24).
45. Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and CriminalActivity of
the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 304, 309 (1972).
A very similar experience ocurred in Pennsylvnia. See Dixon v. Attorney Gen.,
325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); T. THORNBERRY & J. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY
INSANE: A COMMUNITY FOLLOW-UP OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS (1977) (only fourteen percent of 438 released "mentally disordered offenders" engaged in injurious behaviors within four years of release). See also Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Cocozza & Steadman, Some Refinements in the Measurement and Prediction of Dangerous Behavior, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1012, 101314 (1976); Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371 (1972); Steadman, A New Look at Recidivism
among Patuxent Inmates, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 200 (1977).
In reassessing their Baxstrom reasearch, Cocozza and Steadman suggested the
generalizability of their results to contemporary patient populations could be limited
because of the high average age (47) and mean length of continuous institutionalization (almost 15 years) of the Baxtrom group, and because their retention in institutions
for the criminally insane could have been the result of administrative inertia or discretion rather than dangerousness. Cocozza & Steadman, supra at 1093-94. However,
Cocozza and Steadman concluded elsewhere that incorporating age variables yielded a
false positive ratio of two to one and "if we were to attempt to use this information for
statistically predicting dangerous behavior our best strategy would still be to predict
that none of the patients would be dangerous." Cocozza & Steadman, supra at 1013-
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In short, the psychiatrists "lacked the ability properly to diagnose
dangerous mental illness and to determine the necessity for maximum
security confinement." 4 6 Mr. Chief Justice Burger concluded: "There
can be little responsible debate regarding 'the uncertainty of diagnosis
in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment.' ,47 Reliance upon mental health professional's predictions of dangerousness results in commitment of several nondangerous persons for every truly
harmful person, 48 a minimum overcommitment of several hundred
percent.
Courts now hold that a better approach to the police power criterion for civil commitment is to require findings of specific violent behavior rather than to rely solely on a medical assessment of dangerousness. 49 Many state civil commitment statutes also require additional

Monahan weathered the bureaucratic inertia suggestion by concluding: "It is not
an acceptable retort to the research for psychiatrists and psychologists to say, after the
fact, that they did not really believe the patients to be violent. If bureaucratic pressure
influences prediction, then that pressure is part of the social reality that should be

empirically studied." J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
51 (1981). Following his extensive review of the dangerousness prediction literature,
Monahan concluded: "It may be that short-term 'emergency' predictions in a person's
normal environment generate more accurate estimates of violent behavior." Id. at 60.
However, a "judicious assessment of the research to date is that we know very little
about how accurately violent behavior may be predicted under many circumstances."
Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
46. Morris, Criminality and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 784,
796 (1969).
47. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (citing Greenwood v.
United States, 350 U.S. at 375 and Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption
of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 697-719 (1974)).
See Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 371, 390-91 (1972); Wenck, Robison & Smith, Can Violence be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 395-96 (1972).
48. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 27-33
(1975); Diamond, supra note 42; Laves, The Predictionof Dangerousness as a Criterion for Involuntary Civil Commitment: ConstitutionalConsiderations, 3 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 291 (1975); AMERICAN PSYCIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE REPORT
CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 23-28 (1975).

8:

49. See Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. at 1173; Bension v. Meredith, 455 F.
Supp. at 672; Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. at 453; Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.
Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378; Finken v. Roop, 233

Pa. Super. 762, 339 A.2d 764. (1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 960 (1976).

Published by NSUWorks, 1982

17

Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 9
402

Nova Law Journal

6:1982 1

factual information to reduce the unfairness and speculation in involuntary commitment for dangerousness.5 0 The accuracy and imminence of
predicted dangerousness is enhanced by requiring, as suggested in the
proposed definition, evidence of recent behavior that causes, attempts,
or threatens infliction of "serious, unjustified bodily harm on another
person." As noted above,5 1 the recent overt act requirement mirrors
current legal trends. 2

Definition of "Lacks Sufficient Capacity to Make a Reasonable
Application On His Own Behalf"
Before the Baker Act was amended in 1979, the criteria for involuntary hospitalization included mental illness and either 1) likelihood
of injuring self or others, or 2) need for care or treatment and lack of
sufficient capacity to make a responsible application for treatment. 3
The "need for care and treatment and lacking capacity" provision,
challenged as unconstitutionally vague, was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in In re Beverly by incorporating the following judicial
criteria:
If the person is non-dangerous, the judge must conclude that
he is in need of care and treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to
make a responsible application on his own behalf. A mere conclusion that the person is "in need of care and treatment" is insufficient. The judge must further conclude that such person "lacks sufficient capacity to act for himself."
If the judge concludes that the mental illness manifests itself
in neglect or refusal to care for himself, that such neglect or refusal
poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his well-being, and that he is incompetent to determine for himself whether
treatmentfor his mental illness would be desirable, then the criteria of the statute have been met.
However, even though the other criteria are met, a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in free50. See 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 206-14 (1978).
51. Supra note 38 and text accompanying notes 36-37.
52. E.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. at 517; Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
at 391; Finken v. Roop, 233 Pa. Super. 762, 339 A.2d 764.
53. FLA. STAT. §§ 394.467(1)(a)-(b) (1977).
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dom by himself or with the help of willing and responsiblefamily
54
members or friends should never be hospitalized involuntarily.

Most of the third paragraph is verbatim from the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in O'Connorv. Donaldson.55
The 1979 amendments to the Baker Act removed the "lacks sufficient capacity" language from the statutory criteria, and replaced it
with some of the language from Beverly: "In need of care and treatment which, if not provided, may result in neglect or refusal to care
for himself, and such neglect or refusal poses a real andpresent threat
of substantial harm to his well being."5
The problem with the 1979 revision is its failure to incorporate all
of the criteria required by the Florida Supreme Court. There was no
provision, for example, that the person be "incompetent to determine
for himself whether treatment for his mental illness would be desirable. '57 The changes proposed here restore the "lacks sufficient capacity
to make a reasonable application on his own behalf" language required
by the Florida Supreme Court, and provide a statutory definition for
this parens patriaecommitment criterion. The suggested definition is as
follows:
"Lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application on
his own behalf" means the person's inability, by reason of mental
condition, to achieve a rudimentary understanding, after conscientious efforts at explanation, of the purpose, nature or possible significant benefits of treatment; provided that a person shall be
deemed incapable of understanding the purpose of treatment if,
due to impaired mental ability to perceive reality, he cannot realize
that he has recently engaged in behavior likely to injure himself or
others; and provided further that a person shall be deemed to lack
sufficient capacity if his reason for refusing treatment is expressly

54. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 487 (emphasis added).
55. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 576: "In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends."
56. See FLA. STAT. § 394.463(2)(a)(2) and § 394.467(1)(b)(2) (1979) (emphasis
added).
57. 342 So. 2d at 487.
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based on either the belief that he is unworthy of treatment or the
desire to destroy, harm or punish himself.
This definition specifies objective standards relating to an individual's mental functioning. 58 It appropriately focuses on the individual's
ability to understand the purpose, nature and benefits of treatment.59
The definition provides for a finding of incapacity when an individual
believes himself unworthy of treatment, or expressly desires to be selfdestructive.
As suggested by Beverly, a finding of incapacity should be a constitutional pre-condition for acceptable parens patriae commitments, 0
i.e., commitments based on the authority to protect individuals who
cannot act for themselves.6" Because civil commitment results in loss of
individual liberty, "due process requires that the nature . . . of com-

mitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed. '6 2 The compelling state interest for parenspatriae commitment is to provide mental health care for individuals who
cannot address their own mental health needs. Because many mentally
ill persons are as capable of making their own hospitalization decisions
as physically ill persons,63 due process requires a finding of individual
incapacity or incompetence before a mentally ill person can be hospitalized involuntarily.
The individual's interest in freedom from inappropriate parens patriae commitment is bolstered by the constitutional right to privacy and

58.

For a more specific explanation, see 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. AT 91-93.

59.

Halleck, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Behavior Control, 131 AM. J. PSYCHI-

ATRY 381 (1974).

60. See 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 90.

61. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). See generally Coleman & Solomon, Parens Patriae "Treatment". Legal Punishment in Disguise, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 345 (1976); Curtis, The Checkered Career of ParensPatriae: The
State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895 (1976); Custer, The Origins of
the Doctrine of "ParensPatriae," 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978) (parens patriaejurisdiction, which came to be vested in courts of equity, is based on "a logical but incorrect
restatement of a misprinted precedent"); Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1975).
62. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).

63. See, e.g., Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 88-89 (1968).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss3/9

20

Schmidt: A Proposal for Changing Florida's Civil Commitment System
Florida's Civil Commitment System

16:1982

405

1

autonomy. 64 The Florida Constitution states: "Right of Privacy--every
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental

intrusion

into his

private

life

except

as otherwise

provided

herein ... ."165

A number of courts have already recognized that the mentally ill
person, like the physically ill person, must be allowed to decide whether
to seek hospitalization, unless the state can show his inability to make
such a decision because of the illness. 6 Other courts have relied on the
reasoning and language of O'Connorv. Donaldson67 to find unconstitutional state laws based only on the parens patriae authority. 68 Several
courts have either eliminated parens patriaeas a rationale for involuntary commitment or found the parens patriae standard so vague and
unreviewable as to violate due process.69
The proposed definition for "lacks sufficient capacity" salvages the
constitutionality of the parens patriaecriterion for involuntary commitment and provides more objective standards for assessing such
70
competency.

64. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right to terminate pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to contraception in the
privacy of the home); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976) (right
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances).
65.

FLA. CONST. art. 1,

§ 23.

66. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65,
68 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist.
Court, 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D.
Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1978 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
67. 422 U.S. at 575-76.
68. E.g., Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Stamus v. Leonard,
414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Finken v. Roop, 233 Pa. Super. 762, 339 A.2d 764
(1975).
69. E.g., Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Bell v. Wayne
County Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va.
417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974); In re Levias, 83 Wash. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973); In re
Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973).
70. See Note, supra note 19, at 1429 (specifically recommending the adoption of
this suggested incapacity standard).
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Payment for Care of Involuntary Patients
Florida currently allows the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to require involuntary patients, their spouses, parents of
involuntarily committed children, and third party payors to participate
in the cost of services or to pay fees for services, even if the services are
unwanted. 1 This creates a financial incentive for public mental institutions to admit involuntary patients and to retain them longer than
might otherwise be necessary. Requiring maintenance fees for involuntary patients places public mental institutions in a conflict of interests
between expeditious treatment and discharge on one hand, and economic reward for holding involuntary patients on the other. The practice is a financial disincentive to high quality and low cost mental
health care. Furthermore, facilities are thus discouraged from competing with each other.
The suggested amendment to section 394.457(7) is as follows:
(7) PAYMENT FOR CARE OF PATIENTS.-Fees and fee
collections for patients in treatment facilities shall be according to
s. 402.33, except that no person evaluated, detained, committed or
treated involuntarily pursuant to the provisions of this part, or parents or spouse of the person, or third party payor, shall be required
to participate in the costs or to pay fees incurred for their evaluation, treatment, care, maintenance or custody pursuant to this part;
provided that if, upon the patient's request the patient is placed in
any private facility, the patient shall bear the expense of the patient's care, maintenance and treatment at such facility.

This amendment codifies the right of involuntarily committed patients not to pay the costs of unwanted services through their families
or third party payors. There is already some legal support for the proposition that involuntary patients should not be required to pay for unwanted services.72 While, the state might argue that treatment of invol-

71. FLA. STAT. § 394.457(7) & § 402.33 (1979).
72. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 896 (D. Conn. 1974), 386 F.
Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975);
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (1964); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Holey, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 379 P.2d
22, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1963); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America, 3
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untary patients results in an implied contract with unjust enrichment of
the involuntary patient; this theory is unlikely to succeed.7 3 The doubletaxation aspects of requiring involuntary patients to pay for state mandated treatment is a more viable argument against such payments.7 '
Policy objections to requiring involuntary patients to pay for care
they do not request, include: maintenance fees extracted from involuntary patients are not always expended for purposes of their mental
health; enforcement frequently requires those with very little to support
those with even less (rather than a rich relative supporting a poor one);
enforcement creates breaches and rifts in family relationships; and enforcement can deplete and exhaust resources that could finance discharge followed by a less restrictive alternative placement, thus perpetuating dependence and prolonged involuntary hospitalization. 5
Right to Treatment Plan
While a constitutional right to treatment has not been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court,7T Florida does provide a "statuCal. App. 3d 949, 83 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1969); Miller v. State Dep't of Treasury (Revenue Div.), 385 Mich. 296, 188 N.W.2d 795 (1971); Boldt v. State, 98 Wis. 2d 445, 297
N.W.2d 29 (Wis. App. 1980) (state has no claim for support from social security benefits of a person held incompetent to stand trial in mental institution pursuant only to
pending criminal charge); Comment, Compulsory Contribution to Support of State
Mental PatientsHeld Deprivationof Equal Protection,39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 858 (1964);
Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 363 (1968) (discusses attack theories of class legislation, double
taxation, impairments of the obligations of contracts, taking of property without just
compensation, undue delegation of legislative power to administrators, and defective
title).
But cf. Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1979) (not unreasonable to require contribution from criminally insane person); Ivory v. Wainwright, 393 So. 2d 542
(Fla. 1980) (upholding prisoner pay law); In re Nelson, 98 Wis. 2d 261, 296 N.W.2d
736 (1980) (payment for care upheld for acquittee by reason of mental disease); Op.
Atty. Gen., 074-271 (Fla., Sept. 6, 1974) (patient may be involuntarily committed to
private facility if the cost is born by the patient or guardian).
73. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 32, at 156-58.
74. See, e.g., id. at 158; Annot., supra note 72, at 378.
75.

See A. BROOKS,

LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
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(1974).
76. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573 ("there is not reason now to decide whether
mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others have a right to treatment
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tory right to receive individual treatment. 7 The scope of the required
treatment is not clear, however. The current statute merely provides
that no one shall have mental health treatment denied or delayed, that
the least restrictive available treatment shall be utilized, and that a
physical examination must be given within twenty-four hours of
admission. 8
The suggested amendment to section 394.459(2) is as follows:
(d) Not more than 5 days after the beginning of treatment,
each patient shall have and receive an individualized treatment
plan in writing that the patient has maximum opportunity to assist
in preparing. Each plan shall contain at least:
1. A statement of the specific problems and.specific needs of
the patient;
2. A statement of intermediate and long-range objectives, with
a projected timetable for their attainment;
3. A statement and rationale for the plan of treatment for
achieving these objectives;
4. A statement of the least restrictive treatment conditions
necessary to achieve the purposes of placement;
5. A specification of treatment staff responsibility and a

upon compulsory confinement by the State"). Id. at 577-78 n.12 (Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), finding a constitutional right to treatment,

vacated; "deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court's opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case"); Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1981) ("this Court has never found that the involuntarily committed have a constitutional 'right to treatment'..."); Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 933
(5th Cir. 1977).
But cf. Burnham v. Department of Mental Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (no constitutional right to treatment), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) and Donaldson, 493 F.2d 507).
See also Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W.
4681 (June 18, 1982) (persons involuntarily committed to state institutions for the
mentally retarded have due process rights to: conditions of reasonable care and safety,
freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint, and "such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure [the patient's] safety and to facilitate
[the patient's] ability to function free from bodily restraints." Id. at 4683).
77. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 566-67 n.2; FLA. STAT. § 394.459(2) (1981).
78. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, enforced 334 F. Supp. 1341, 134344 (1971), supplemented Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 384 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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description of proposed staff involvement with the patient in order
to attain the objectives;
6. Criteria for release to less restrictive treatment conditions;
7. The additional disclosure information required in s. 394.459
(3)(a).
The requirement for individualized treatment plans and their elements
are taken from federal court decisions in Alabama and the fifth circuit.
Individualized treatment plans are one of the three fundamental conditions (along with a humane psychological and physical environment,
and sufficient numbers of qualified staff) for minimally adequate treatment in public mental institutions. This does not involve legislative prescription of treatment, but rather identifies and specifies a condition
without which treatment cannot possibly occur.
This amendment would not appear to be unnecessary since these
elements are already prescribed by judicial decision. However, some institution staff do not know the elements of a treatment plan, or its significance; thus this amendment would facilitate implementation of each
patient's statutory right to treatment for mental illness.79
Definition of "Safety Justifying Emergency Treatment"
Regarding the right to express and informed consent, Florida's
statute until recently provided that treatment "may" be rendered a patient, who refuses treatment and is not discharged, "on an emergency
basis, upon the written order of a mental health professional when such
mental health professional determines treatment is necessary for the
safety of the patient or others." 80 Treatment without consent was only
authorized when an emergency jeopardized the safety of the patient or
others. This section was recently held to be unconstitutional.8 "
79. See also W. SCHMIDT, THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH
(Nat'l A. of Att'y Gen. 1976); Spece, Justifying Invigorated Scrutiny and the
Least Restrictive Alternative As a SuperiorForm of Intermediate Review: Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment as a Case Study, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1049 (1979);
Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive
Development of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 1
(1978).
80. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) (1981).
81. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) and § 394.467(4)(h) have been declared unconLAW
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The suggested amendment would add the following language:
"Safety is jeopardized only by a situation threatening death or serious bodily harm."

It is elementary tort law, according to Prosser quoting Mr. Justice
Holmes, that "'[t] he absence of lawful consent is part of the definition
of an assault.' "82 Consent can be implied "in an emergency which
threatens death or serious bodily harm, [but] the mere desirability of
treatment cannot justify. . .going ahead without the consent of the patient, or at least that of a near relative."83 Furthermore, "[if the plaintiff is known to be incapable of giving consent because of. . .mental
incompetence, his failure to object, or even his active manifestation of
consent will not protect the defendant."" 4
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services nevertheless changed the presumably clear legislative intent regarding the right
to consent by defining "safety" as "the physical and emotional well
being of an individual separate and apart from threat or violence, either physical or verbal. 8 5 There is little direct authority to justify
"emotional well being" as a definition for "safety." The most recent
substantial definition of that word consists of a remand by the United
stitutional because they allowed hearing examiners to make the judicial decision regarding competence to consent to treatment during recommitment hearings in violation
of FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 20(c)(3). Bentley v. State ex rel. Rogers, 398 So. 2d 992 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Section 20(c)(3) gives the circuit courts jurisdiction over
proceedings relating to "guardianship, involuntary hospitalization, the determination of
incompetency." (By similar reasoning, the provisions allowing hearing examiner juris-

diction over continued involuntary hospitalization should also be unconstitutional).
The 1982 legislature addressed the problem identified by Bentley through passage
of CS/HB 665 which changed "hearing examiner" to "court" in section 394.
459(3)(a), and provided that the hearing examiner may issue a recommended order to
the court regarding incompetence to consent to treatment in section 394. 467(4)(h).
The decision in Bentley and the legislative activity occurred while this article was
being written. The proposal here regarding the definition of "safety justifying emergency treatment" is otherwise viable.
82. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 102 (3d ed. 1964).
83. Id. at 104.
84. Id. at 103-04. See also Furrow, Defective Mental Treatment: A Proposalfor
the Application of Strict Liability to PsychiatricServices, 58 B.U.L. REv. 391 (1978).
85. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ch. IOE-5.09(10) (1977).
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States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit "for consideration of alternative means for making incompetency determinations in [parens
patriae] situations where any delay [in administration of antipsychotic
drugs] could result in significant deterioration of the patient's mental
health."8 Even this decision held, for the police power situation, that
first there must be procedures for ensuring that patient interests, such
as side effects in refusing antipsychotics, are taken into consideration
by a qualified physician; second, that forcible administration of antipsychotics does not occur absent findings that patient interests are outweighed by a need to prevent violence; and third, that less restrictive
alternatives are unavailable.87
Other courts have defined "emergency" as a situation in which a
physician certifies there has been "a sudden, significant change in the
patient's condition which creates danger to the patient himself or to
others in the hospital,"88 or "where a patient presents a danger to himself or other members of society" (or is judicially declared incompetent).89 An administrative bulletin of the New Jersey Division of
Mental Health and Hospitals allowed emergency administration of
medication "if a physician certifies that it is essential to administer
psychotropic medication in order to prevent death or serious consequences to a patient." 90 The prior Florida law that was tracked in
drafting 394.459(3)(a) provided for emergency surgical treatment only
where it is deemed lifesaving, or following a mandatory adversarial
hearing to determine the appropriateness of surgery.91
Notwithstanding some questions regarding procedures for implementing the right to consent,92 the mental patient's constitutional right
86. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 660 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W.
4676 (U.S. June 18, 1982) (for consideration in light of In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40
(Mass. 1981). But see note 40 supra.
87. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 657.
88. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1313 (D.N.J. 1979).
89. In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1980).
90. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1149 (D.N.J. 1978).
91. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(b) and (c) (1979).
92. See Bentley v. State ex rel. Rogers, 398 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981). (FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) and § 394.467(4)(h) violate article 5, section
20(c)(3) of the Florida Constitution regarding circuit court jurisdiction over guardianship, involuntary hospitalization, the determination of incompetency.) By similar reasoning, the provisions allowing hearing examiner jurisdiction over continued involun-
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to refuse intrusive treatment, such as the administration of psychotropic (antipsychotic) medication, is becoming recognized in Florida. 3
There are many legal bases for the right to consent to, and refuse,
treatment: privacy and personal autonomy (including the ninth amendment); 94 first amendment protection of thought processes or religious
beliefs; eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment protection
prohibiting use of drugs for control or aversive conditioning; procedural
and substantive due process; equal protection; and using the least restrictive alternative.95

As noted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court: "There is no support
in common law for the proposition that treatment, medical or psychiatric, constitutes a legally nonreversible medical decision. .

.

.In a soci-

ety ruled by laws [rather than by individuals], social actions that infringe or control individual freedoms must be judged by legal
tary hospitalization should also be unconstitutional.
93. In re Rewis, Case No. 80-2011B (Division of Administrative Hearings, Feb.
20, 1981) (citing Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3rd Cir. 1976)); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360
(D. Mass. 1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 451 U.S. 906 (1981); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978),
enforced, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), refusing stay, 481 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J.
1979) (appeal pending in the Third Circuit); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980);
Geodecke v. Department of Insts., 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979) (en banc) (decided on basis of state law); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Pa. 1976);
Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976); Kaimowitz v. Department
of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 147, Case No. 73-18434-AW (Mich.
Wayne Co. Cir. Ct. filed July 10, 1973).
94. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23: "Right of Privacy--every natural person
has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life
except as otherwise provided herein."
95. See generally Dubose, Of the Parens PatriaeCommitment Power and Drug
Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1976); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy:
Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. L. REv. 461 (1977); Schwarz, In
the Name of Treatment: Autonomy, Civil Commitment, and the Right to Refuse
Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 808 (1975); Comment, Madness and Medicine:
The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 497; Comment, Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48
TEMP. L.Q. 354 (1975). See also Comment, Brave New World Revisited: Fifteen
Years of Chemical Sacraments, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 879 (1980).
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standards."9 The American Pyschiatric Association has thus recognized the individual's right to refuse treatment:
Except in emergencies, if a patient who is competent to participate in treatment decisions declines to accept treatment recommended by staff, we accept the patient's right to refuse. If the physician believes the patient is not competent to participate in
treatment decisions, he should ask a court to rule on the patient's
competency. If the patient is found not competent, an impartial
third party, designated by the court, should be given the authority
of consent.9"

Many psychiatrists consider forced treatment to be unethical.98
The rule 9 promulgated by the Florida Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services flies in the face of this consensus, and the clear
legislative intent. 10 0 The rule, if honored, makes the statutorily man-

dated right to express and informed consent meaningless. The rule requires treatment to occur with the label of "emergency treatment order" whenever there is refusal to consent by a patient, or refusal by the
guardian or guardian advocate of an incompetent patient, or failure to
discharge the refusing patient. The rule does not allow the refusal of
treatment to be honored under any circumstances.
The suggested definition of "emergency" would further clarify legislative intent, and conform Florida's law to recent legal developments.
96. In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d at 751.
97. Id. (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON

THE
RIGHT TO TREATMENT, THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE CARE AND TREATMENT FOR THE

MENTALLY ILL AND MENTALLY RETARDED 12 (Final Draft, May 8, 1975)). But see In
re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. Supp. Jud. Ct. 1981) (a court, not a third party, must
determine what an incompetent patient living in the community would have preferred
when competent before allowing the state to administer antipsychotic drugs; also, only
the least restrictive of either involuntary confinement, or compulsory medication, may
be used-not both).
98. Address by Lewis H. Gaughan, The Right of a Mental Patient to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, Univ. of Richmond Law School (March 6,

1978). See Gaughan & LaRue, The Right of a Mental Patientto Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, 4 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 43 (1978).
99. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ch. 1OE-5.1 l(3)(b) (1977).
100. Compare FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) (declared unconstitutional, see note

81 supra).
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Treating without consent an individual whose "emotional well being" is
jeopardized is neither constitutionally nor therapeutically appropriate.
"[I]t is universally recognized as fundamental to effective therapy that
the patient acknowledge his illness and cooperate with those attempting
to give treatment."101 Forcibly drugging patients without consent is unacceptable in a society ruled by law.
Clinical Record: Confidentiality
The proposed amendment for Florida Statutes section 394.459(9)
is underlined below:
(9) CLINICAL RECORD: CONFIDENTIALITY. A clinical record for each patient shall be maintained. The record shall include data pertaining to admission and such other information as may be required under rules of the department. Unless waived by express and informed consent by the patient or his
guardian or attorney, the privileged and confidential status of the
clinical record shall not be lost by either authorized or unauthorized disclosure to any person, organization, or agency. Notwithstanding s. 90.503(4)(b), no communication made by a patient to a
mental health professional, including but not limited to a psychotherapist, may be used for any purpose other than a proceeding
under this chapter. The clinical record shall not be a public record
and no part of it shall be released, except:. ...
Section 90.503(4)(b) is one of the exceptions to the psychotherapistpatient privilege. The exception provides that there is no psychotherapist-patient privilege for communications made during a court-ordered
examination of a patient's mental condition.
The proposed amendment preserves the confidentiality and fifth
amendment right of a person examined for his mental condition, including a court-ordered examination, not to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal prosecution. With this amendment,
disclosures to a mental health professional could only be used in proceedings under chapter 394.
A strong case can be made for generally affording the right to
101.

O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 584.
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remain silent to individuals in the civil commitment process.102 An exception to the right can be made when refusal precludes the presentation of evidence regarding treatability and capacity to make informed
decisions concerning treatment. Some courts disagree,10 3 but other
courts apply the privilege against self-incrimination to involuntary civil
commitment proceedings. 104
The Florida Supreme Court decided that the psychotherapist-patient privilege provision 0 5 of the old evidence code did not apply to
testimony of the examining physician where the patient was previously
warned that communications would not be privileged. 10 6 Florida's new
102. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 101-04 (applicability of the fifth amendment to civil commitment proceedings and the right to remain silent as a due process
requirement); sources in note 12 supra.
A person in the custody of the police is warned that he or she has a right to
remain silent because of the probability of indirect or subtle coercion to make a statement. Hospital custody in civil commitment is at least as coercive as police custody
because: (1) involuntary mental patients are deprived of liberty and segregated from
friends and family; (2) the person is in an unfamiliar hospital environment at a time of
greatest depression or agitation; (3) patients do not have a right to bail and are dependent upon hospital staff discretion for discharge; (4) patients do not get an attorney
within a matter of hours; (5) patients may not be as mentally capable of protecting
their interests as persons accused of crime; (6) patients receive treatments that can
lessen their ability to remain silent or resist coercive confinement measures; (7) mental
health professionals act as both therapist and agent of the state, whereas police have a
clear adversarial role to persons in custody; and (8) mental health professionals are
probably more experienced and adept at eliciting information than police officers. B.
ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 32, at 75. Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 450 U.S. 929 (1981)
(prosecution use, during sentencing phase of capital murder trial, of unwarned statements, without assistance of counsel, to psychiatrist violates fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and sixth amendment right to counsel).
103. See Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1980); French v.
Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (M.D.N.C. 1977), affid, 443 U.S. 901 (1979);
People ex rel. Keith v. Keith, 38 I11.
2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967); McGuffin v.
State, 571 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Ramsay v. Santa Rose Medical Center,
498 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
104. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1102; Finken v. Roop, 339 A.2d
764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975); State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, Case No. 441-417 (Cir.
Ct. Milw. Wis. filed Aug. 18, 1976), on appeal 249 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. 1977).
105. FLA. STAT. § 90.242(3)(a) (1973).
106. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 489. In addition to the appropriateness of a
warning, the best practice would be to have an attorney present during any psychiatric
interview for civil commitment. See Finken v. Roop, 339 A.2d at 764. See also Lee v.
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evidence code 107 fails to require such a warning, thus increasing the
importance of one commentator's suggestion that the extent of any selfincrimination protection should be clearly set out in the Florida commitment statutes.1 0 8
The amendment proposed here is a compromise position. The position was recognized in a recent California Supreme Court decision
holding the privilege against self-incrimination only protects mentally
disabled individuals from giving evidence that would tend to implicate
them in criminal activity or subject them to potential criminal prosecution.1 09 The amendment would clarify the extent of self-incrimination
protection enjoyed by persons subject to civil commitment in Florida.

Rights of Mental Health Professionals
The suggested amendments to Florida Statutes section 394.460 relating to the rights of mental health professionals are as follows:
(2) Mental health professionals testifying at hearings conducted pursuant to this part may, if appropriately qualified, give
expert testimony:
(a) Describing the present mental functioning of a person
whom the witness has personally examined;
(b) Stating an opinion as to what the prospects are that proposed and available treatment will improve the person's mental
condition;
(c) Stating an opinion whether the person has a mental illness,
as defined in s. 394.455(3); provided that any witness so testifying
shall provide a detailed explanation as to how any such descriptions
and opinions were reached and a specification of all behaviors and
other factual information on which such descriptions and opinions
are based.

County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1971), cert. de-

nied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971) (defendant in criminal proceeding has a right to counsel at
pretrial mental examination).
107. FLA. STAT. § 90.242(3)(a) (1976).
108.

Note, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally IlI Under Florida's

Baker Act: ProceduralDue Process and the Role of the Attorney, 26 U. FLA. L. REV.
508 (1974).
109. Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 783, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1979).
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(3) Mental health professionals testifying at such hearings
shall not be permitted to give opinion testimony:
(a) Stating the diagnostic category applicable to a person, unless the person raises the issue through cross-examination or the
presentation of evidence, or
(b) Notwithstanding s. 90.703, stating a conclusion that a person is likely to injure himself or others, or that a person's neglect or
refusal to care for himself poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his well being.
Much has been written about the rights of mental patients, but
comparatively little is said about the rights of the mental health professionals charged with the care, treatment and honoring of the rights of
mental patients. Mental health professionals complain about spending
an inordinate amount of time in court, in a role they are neither trained
nor qualified to exercise and in an inappropriate adversarial relationship to their patient.110 The suggested amendments delineate the testimony that mental health professionals may offer, limiting it to that
which they are qualified to give.
The amendments excuse mental health professionals from invoking
inconsistent, unreliable and invalid diagnostic labels often established
by vote (e.g., homosexuality voted in and out as a disease) rather than
by scientific verification. Diagnostic labels in the courtroom frequently
communicate impressions of disturbed or incapacitated conditions without providing information useful to the commitment process.11 1
Also specific psychiatric diagnoses are extremely unreliable and
often contradictory.
Civil commitment proceedings call for detailed information
about the individual's mental and emotional functioning. Descriptive information can be supplied by psychiatric and psychological
witnesses without any reference to diagnostic conclusions which are
often of questionable utility to professionals and meaningless or
110. See generally LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS: FRICTION AT
(W. Barton & C. Sanborn eds. 1978); Galie, An Essay on the Civil
Commitment Lawyer: Or How I Learned to Hate the Adversary System, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 71 (1978); Slovenko, CriminalJustice Procedures in Civil Commitment, 24
WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1977).
111. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 47, at 741.
THE INTERFACE
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misleading to laymen."

The amendments also relieve mental health professionals of the
uncomfortable responsibility of deciding the legal criteria for commitment. The responsibility of determining whether an individual meets
the legal criteria for commitment lies with the judge or hearing examiner, based on the evidence presented, not with a psychiartrist. A neutral judge is particularly important in view of the considerable evidence
that psychiatric diagnosis is strongly influenced by the socio-economic
histories of both patient and clinician, with a lower patient socio-economic history biasing the diagnosis toward greater illness and poorer
prognosis than is actually presented by the clinical picture. 113 This ef112.

2

MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 105 (citing V. NORRIS, MENTAL ILLNESS
42-53 (Maudsley monograph No. 6, 1959)) (60% are of agreement on
diagnosis of 6,253 patients when second diagnostician knew the original diagnosis). A
1962 research project illustrates this point: Beck, Ward, Mock, & Erbaugh, Reliability
of Psychiatric Diagnoses: 2. A Study of Consistency of Clinical Judgments and Ratings, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 351, 356 (1962) (average rate of agreement for specific
IN LONDON

diagnoses under controlled conditions was only 54%). See generally J. ZISKIN, COPING
WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 123-45 (1970); Ash, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses,44 J. ABN. & SOC. PSYCH. 272 (1949) (three psychiatrists all agreed on specific diagnoses in only 20% of the cases and all three disagreed

31% of the time). Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil
Commitments, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 80 (1968) ("The diagnostician has the ability to
shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any person he wishes. .. ."); Schmidt
& Fonda, The Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnosis:A New Look, 52 J. ABN. & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 262 (1956) (47% agreement as to classification of non-organic
psychoses).
See supra notes 22-25. DSM-III probably constitutes an improvement over DSMII, but whether reliability and validity are sufficiently high for legal use remain to be
thoroughly reseached. J. ZISKIN, supra note 24 and numerous sources cited therein.
In addition to endorsement by the Florida Bar, the suggested provisions regarding
rights of mental health professionals have been specifically and unanimously endorsed
by the Board of Directors for the Florida Mental Health Association. FLORIDA
MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION, BAKER ACT REVIEW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT

(Oct. 1981).
113. See Lee & Temerlin, Social Class, Diagnosis, and Prognosisfor Psychotherapy, 7

PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH

&

PRAC.

181 (1970) and sources

cited in Ennis & Litwack, supra note 47, at 724 n.108.
See also Roth & Lerner, Sex-Based Discriminationin the Mental Institutionalization of Women, 62 CAL. L. REV. 789 (1974) (Psychiatric bias based on sex makes it
easier for a woman to be committed than a man under the same circumstances, results
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fect combines with the extremely deficient predictions of assaultive and
suicidal behavior discussed earlier. A review of the literature and research 114 necessarily leads to the conclusion that psychiatric predictions
of dangerousness to self and others, and predictions of the need for care
and treatment, are invalid; that psychiatric judgments are not sufficiently reliable or valid to justify their admissibility under traditional
rules of evidence; and that psychiatric judgments do not convey meaningful or otherwise unavailable information about the issues relevant in
a civil commitment proceeding.
Whether the suggested amendment to the statutory section titled
"Rights of mental health professionals" actually increases or abridges
the rights of mental health professionals probably depends upon the
perception of the individual professional. Some would say the suggested amendments abridge their right to speak freely, the right to use
specialized terminology and expertise to provide greater justice and humanity for their patients. Others would say the suggested amendments
promote efficiency in their court appearances, lessen their adversarial
approach to their patients and free them of judgmental roles.
Admission for Court-Ordered Evaluation, Involuntary
Placement, and Continued Involuntary Placement
The suggested amendments in the last sections of the proposed bill
(Appendix) do the following things:
(1) provide that the "need of care or treatment" criterion for
court-ordered evaluation and involuntary placement be manifest
rather than predicted;
(2) restore the "lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable apin different treatment for women-such as more use of electro-convulsive therapy and
psycho-surgery-and makes it more difficult for women to be released. Women are
often hospitalized for exhibiting traits which would not lead to hospitalization for a
man, such as aggressiveness, running away, or sexual promiscuity.)
114. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 47. The uncertainty, tentativeness, fallibility,
and subjectivity of psychiatric diagnosis and judgment have been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court. Addington, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor,422 U.S. at
584.
See generally Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalizationand Psychiatric Testimony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP.
U.L. REv. 11 (1976).
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plication in his own behalf" criterion to court-ordered evaluation
and involuntary placement, as required by the Florida Supreme
Court to maintain constitutionality;
(3) change the maximum period of initial involuntary placement
from six months to three months if likely to injure others, or in
need of care or treatment, and from six months to two weeks if
likely to injure self;
(4) allow one continued involuntary placement;
(5) require substantial probability that treatment will significantly
improve the patient's mental condition before continued involuntary placement can occur.
Many of the justifications for these suggestions have been discussed above. Requiring manifest evidence of need for care or treatment, rather than prediction of need, is consistent with the legal trend
toward requiring recent overt acts; this minimizes the extent to which
commitment becomes preventive detention, and recongizes the inability
of any witness to accurately predict another's future behavior.
Restoring the "lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application on his own behalf" criterion to court-ordered evaluation and
involuntary placement assures the constitutionality of the commitment
criteria as required by the Florida Supreme Court in Beverly. 115 A
finding of incompetence seems to be a constitutional pre-condition to
commitment against one's wishes.
The suggested amendments also shorten the maximum period of
initial involuntary placement and allow one continued involuntary
placement. Prolonged hospitalization is antitherapeutic and harmful to
patients. One review of earlier studies concluded: "The major thrust of
the evidence is that living in an institution has harmful physical and
psychological effects

. . .

regardless of the particular characteristics of

the population or the unique qualities of the total institution."116 The
115. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 487.
116. Prock, Effects of Institutionalization:A Comparison of Community, Waiting List and InstitutionalizedAged Persons, 59 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1837 (1969). See
BARTON, INSTITUTIONAL NEUROSIS (1966); WING & BROWN, INSTITUTIONALIZATION
AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (1970); Gruenberg, From Practice to Theory: Community
Mental Health Service and the Practice of Neurosis, 1969 THE LANCET 721; Myerson,
Can Institutionalization Be Prevented?, MASS. J. MENTAL HEALTH 17 (Summer
1972).
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negative effects of prolonged institutionalization so outweigh any benefits of continued confinement that staff ultimately expend more energy
treating the negative secondary effects than they do treating the original condition. 117 The issue then becomes the appropriate maximum period of involuntary commitment. The broadest proposal for amending
civil commitment standards presented by the President's Commission
on Mental Health limits the original commitment to six weeks, with
one possible six week extension.11 8 The initial commitment period in
Michgan has been sixty days,119 ninety days in California12 0 and Washington, 21 and four months in Maine.1 22 There is statistical support for
an involuntary commitment period of no more than ninety days. 23 The
American Psychological Association, the American Orthopsychiatric
Association and leading commentators agree with the amendments proposed here: no one should be involuntarily committed to a mental institution for more than a total of six months. 24
California has had different commitment periods for persons
presenting different problems. For example, when a patient demonstrates at least an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to
others (likely to injure others), the commitment period is limited to
ninety days. Persons presenting at least an imminent threat of taking
See also Kiesler, Mental Hospitalsand Alternative Care: Noninstitutionalization
as Potential Public Policy for Mental Patients, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 349 (1982)

(reviewed ten studies randomly assigning treatment modes of seriously ill psychiatric
patients and found no case where hospitalization was more beneficial than alternative
treatment).
117. LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, 437-50, 514-20, 749-55
(B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973). See also O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 574-75.
118. TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE

reprintedin 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 117-22
TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES].

TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES,

(1978). [hereinafter cited as
119.

MICH. COMP.

120.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE

LAWS

§ 330.1472 (1980).

§§ 5300-5304 (Deering 1979)(the Code provides for 14 days of intensive treatment plus further treatment not to exceed 90 days.
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.320 (1975).
122. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2334 (Supp. 1978).
123. See Shah, Some Interactionsof Law and Mental Health in the Handlingof
Social Deviance, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 674 (1974).
124. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 32, at 130; B. Ennis & P. Friedman,
supra note 117, at 437.
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their own life (likely to injure self) are subject to two fourteen-day
commitment periods. 125 This different policy for suicidals is consistent
with the lack of substantial evidence that mental health services successfully prevent suicides.1 28 In fact, there is some evidence that involuntary treatment may increase the rate of suicide.1 27 The President's
Commission on Mental Health suggests a forty-eight hour commitment
for suicide attempters.1 28 Greenberg recommends physical and medical
interference for twenty-four hours maximum. 29
One evaluation of California's overall experience with limited term
commitments came to the following conclusions:
-"patient discharge was affected by time periods at which staff
decisions were forced by non-therapeutic requirements;"
-"the 14-day certification time period for involuntary patients
conforms closely to the optimum time periods utilized by professional staff without any legally imposed limitations;"
-"having the patient committed until medically ready for discharge did not result in any better prognosis than when the patient was mandatorily released;"
-"results indicate little correlation between prognosis and keeping individuals hospitalized until medically ready for discharge;"
-prior to the statutory limitations, "involuntary patients were
hospitalized longer than voluntary," while as a result of the limitations, "the trend reversed;"
-the study "supports the contention by some professionals that
there is little correlation between treatment duration and later
outcomes;"
-the results "negate the prediction that mandatory discharge at
a specified time would result in a significant detriment to treat-

125. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5150-5152, 5200-5213, 5250-5268 (Deering
Supp. 1979). There is also a provision for a 72-hour evaluation.
126. See Greenberg, supra note 29, at 256 (the few controlled studies on the
effectiveness of treatment for suicidals are inconsistent or negative); Light, Treating
Suicide: The Illusions of a ProfessionalMovement, 25 INT'L SOC. SCl. J. 475, 482-84

(1973).
127. Greenberg, supra note 29, at 236, 250, 256-59.
128.

TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL IssuEs,

supra note 118.

129. Greenberg, supra note 29, at 243.
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ment and functional level of the discharged patient." '

Several United States Supreme Court decisions support limited periods for involuntary commitment. The Court held in Jackson v. Indiana that persons incompetent to stand trial can be confined only for a
limited period of time: "At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed."1 31 In McNeil v. Director, the Court held that "just as the [Jackson] principle limits the permissible length of a commitment on account of incompetence to stand
trial, so it also limits the permissible length of a commitment 'for ob130. A. Urmer, A Study of California's New Mental Health Law (1969-1970),
ENKI Research Institute, 1242-51.
131. 406 U.S. at 738. In Jackson, a mentally defective deaf mute was found
incompetent to stand trial in cases involving two separate robberies of four and five
dollars respectively, and was committed indefinitely for treatment until competence
could be restored. At the time of the appeal, the petitioner had been confined for three
and one-half years; the record indicated it was unlikely he would ever be able to fully
participate in his trial. The Court indicated there must be progress toward that degree
of competence, the goal of his confinement. If it was not likely that goal would be
achieved, then the State must either release him or initiate the customary civil commitment proceeding. The Court set no specific time limits, but noted his three and one-half
year confinement to date and cited New York legislation providing that a misdemeanor
defendant could be committed for no more than ninety days nor a felony defendant
committed for more than two-thirds of the maximum sentence permissible if convicted.
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 730.50(1), (3) (1971).
Jackson is an incompetence-to-stand-trial commitment case, rather than a civil
commitment case, but it illustrates the duration of commitment must relate to the purpose of confinement.
Cf Flicker v. Florida, 352 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (concern
expressed about six months detention in jail after discharge from hospital as competent

to stand trial); Williams & Miller, The Processing and Disposition of Incompetent
Mentally I11 Offenders, 5 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 245 (1981) (Florida mentally ill
offenders spend unnecesarily long periods of time in jail and hospital awaiting court
processing).
See generally, e.g., Comment, Substantive Due Process Limits on the Durationof

Civil Commitment for the Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
205 (1981) (proposed a quantitative declining-marginal-benefit criterion for civil commitment based upon a net benefit principle legally grounded in Jackson v. Indiana).
The declining-marginal-benefit criterion appears more technical than may be legislatively or judicially feasible at this time.
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In O'Connor v. Donaldson, the Court cited these two

"consticases for the proposition that involuntary commitment cannot
1 33
tutionally continue" after the basis for commitment ceases.
Extended involuntary commitments in Florida are an inappropriate use of limited resources. Commitment periods seem to correspond
to the length of time that government reimbursement is available
rather than to patient needs. Involuntary commitment periods should
be limited to a maximum of two three-month periods for those who are

likely to injure others or are in need of care or treatment. A maximum
of two two-week periods should be given to those likely to injure themselves. Persons who are so dangerous that they commit crimes should
be prosecuted in the criminal justice system. Persons with chronic disabilities should be processed pursuant to guardianship law.
Finally, the amendments provide that the additional involuntary
commitment period can occur only if there is substantial probability
that treatment during the additional period will significantly improve
the patient's mental condition. The two concepts encompassed by this

treatability criterion are:
First, the individual's condition should be susceptible to improvement or cure through techniques that may properly be administered involuntarily. A second and equally important aspect of
treatability is that the resources needed to achieve improvement or
cure are available and will be applied."'

132. McNeil v. Director, 407 U.S. 245, 248-50 (1972). In McNeil, a person convicted of two assaults in 1966 and sentenced to five years imprisonment was referred to
Patuxent Institution for examination to determine the appropriateness of indefinite
commitment to Patuxent under Maryland's Defective Delinquency Law, MD. CODE

ANN. art. 31B (1971). The prisoner allegedly refused to cooperate with the examination. No determination was made, the sentence expired, and confinement in Patuxent
continued. Citing Jackson, the Court in McNeil held it was a denial of due process to
hold someone for observation indefinitely, without sufficiently safeguarding his rights,
where there is no reason to anticipate the person will be easier to examine in the future.
McNeil involved commitment of a convicted person for observation and evaluation,
rather than civil commitment; but it illustrates when the purpose of confinement no
longer exists, confinement for that purpose must cease. Thus, confinement of the mentally ill cannot constitutioially continue if the basis for commitment (e.g., treatment
for dangerousness to others, treatment for dangerousness to self) no longer exists.
133. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
134. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 93.
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The treatability criterion is a corollary and rough equivalent of Judge
Johnson's ruling in Wyatt v. Stickney that persons who are involuntarily committed to a mental institution have a "right to receive such
individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to
be cured or to improve his or her mental condition." 135 Unless an involuntarily committed person is treatable, "the hospital is transformed
into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted
offense." '
In short, "[t]o deprive any citizen of his or her liberty
upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate resources violates the very
'13
fundamentals of due process. 7
Deliberations about limiting the duration of commitments and requiring treatability should address the consequences of such changes.
The anticipated results include reduced commitment of the many people predicted to be dangerous who do not actually inflict harm;
"criminalization" of some frightening or annoying behavior; increased
diversion of persons from the criminal justice system to mental health
treatment program participation agreements; effective intervention in
suicide attempts similar to the successful British program "Samaritans"; increased voluntary mental health services; increased utilization
of guardianship; increased demand for and provision of non-mental
hopsital custodial care for the elderly poor; less harm to people in public mental hospitals; and more appropriate use of limited resources.""
Conclusion
The Florida Mental Health Act (Baker Act) does not reflect recent developments in mental disability law. Despite its intended design,
135. Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 784. For a recent exhaustive and sophisticated rehabilitation of the right to treatment, relying upon the constitutional principle of the least
restrictive alternative, see Spece, supra note 79.
136. Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 784 (citing Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943,
950 (1960)).
137. Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 785.
138. See 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 94-96.
Cf MD. CODE ANN. art. 31B (1977) (abolishing indeterminate sentence; making
program participation optional with eligible offenders; establishing mandatory twentyfive year sentence for third-time violent offenders, without parole except through
Patuxent).
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to encourage voluntary admissions for mental health care, an excessively high proportion of admissions are involuntary. Commitment
hearings in much of Florida are embarrassingly short, especially considering that the consequences (lifelong stigma, prolonged institutionalization) can be worse than conviction for a crime. There are hundreds
of persons in Florida's unaccredited public mental institutions who have
received institutional care for dozens of years, even though institutionalization is neither the most appropriate nor least restrictive placement.
The result is that their primary problem is the institutionalization syndrome itself. Many have the anomolous and illegal classification of being "voluntary," though incompetent, and without a guardian.
Many of these problems result from a lack of less restrictive alternatives. However, they are also the product of any bureaucracy's tendency to follow the path of least resistance. It is still comparatively
easy to have a person involuntarily committed, and recommitted, in
Florida.
The suggested amendments to Florida's Baker Act reviewed here,
reflect recent legal developments. They are consistent with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Mental Health, the national Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment, and the experiences in
other states and countries. Based on the following conclusions of a recent survey of psychiatrists, it is also fair and accurate to say: "Most
psychiatrists are generally in favor of extending civil rights to their patients" 13 9 and "phychiatrists would be better characterized as supporting the increased concern over [legal] rights than as opposing it."140
-Psychiatrists do not favor involuntary civil commitment for individuals who are mentally ill but not dangerous.
-Psychiatrists favor a restrictive definition of dangerous to
others which is based on recent behavioral evidence and the imminent likelihood of a future ocurrence.
-Psychiatrists
hold that "commitment hearings should be
mandatory."
139. 2

MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 677 (1978).
Kahle & Sales, Due Process of Law and the Attitudes of Professionals
Toward Involuntary Civil Commitment; LISPETT & SALES, NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSY-

140.

CHOLOGICAL RESEARCH

(1978).
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-Psychiatrists favor extending a number of rights to the subject
of a commitment petition during the process of involuntary civil
commitment proceedings.
-Psychiatrists favor extending a number of rights to individuals
who have been involuntarily committed.
-There is little in the way of major "differences between the philosophy of psychiatrists and the philosophy of lawyers" which
should influence the wording of involuntary civil commitment
laws. .

.

. [T]he philosophical rivalry appears to be between the

American Psychiatric Association leadership and membership.
While the leadership prefers to ignore past psychiatric abuses and
to defend the "right" to be "unencumbered by complicated legal
procedures," the membership prefers to protect against future
14 1
abuses through legislation.
Rather than reflect a so-called "criminalization" of civil commitment, the suggested amendments change the present situation whereby
persons accused of crime are accorded more rights and protections than
persons committed to a mental institution against their will. Legal protections are particularly important for persons subject to involuntary
commitment, who are least able to protect themselves, or get someone
else to protect them.
The suggested amendments orient Florida's Baker Act toward a
health care model,"4 2 and away from a preventive detention social control model. The amendments will reduce cost by minimizing inappropriate use of expensive mental health facilities and resources.
The manner in which a society deals with its less fortunate and
disadvantaged is often said to be the measure of a civilization. More
immediately the question should be asked: what protections would I
want for myself, my family, or a friend, if we were subject to involuntary civil commitment in Florida?

141. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 677-78.
142. See Cumming & Gover, Therapeutic Consequences of the Involuntary
Commitment Process, 2 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 37 (1979) (commitment process
has therapeutic value for patients; adversary process presents role model for rational
approach to problem solving).

Published by NSUWorks, 1982

43

Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 9

1 428

Nova Law Journal

6:1982 1

Appendix
A bill to be entitled
An act relating to mental health; amending s.
394.455(3), Florida Statutes, and adding subsection (23),
(24), (25) to said section; providing definitions; amending s.
394.457(7), Florida Statutes; providing an exception to payment for care; amending s. 394.459(3)(a), (9), Florida Statutes, and adding subsection (2)(d) to said section; specifying
when safety is jeopardized; providing for confidentiality; providing for individualized treatment plan; amending s.
394.460, Florida Statutes, adding subsections (2), (3) to said
section; prescribing testimony of mental health professionals;
amending s. 394.463(2)(a), Florida Statutes; providing additional criterion; amending s. 394.467 (1)(b), (2)(d), (3)(a),
(4)(f), Florida Statutes; providing additional criteria; establishing time limitations.
Be It Enacted By the Legislature of the State of Florida
Section 1. Subsection (3) of section 394.455, Florida Statutes, is
amended and subsections (23), (24), and (25) are added to said section
to read:
394.455 Definitions. - As used in this part, unless the context
clearly requires otherwise.
(3) "Mentally ill" means a substantial impairment of emotional
processes, ability to perceive reality or to reason or understand, which
impairment is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior; it
does not include retardation or developmental disability as defined in
Chapter 393, brief periods of intoxication caused by substances such as
alcohol or drugs, or dependence upon or addiction to any substances
such as alcohol or drugs.
(23) "Likely to injure himself" means that it is more likely than
not that in the near future the person will attempt to commit suicide or
inflict serious bodily harm upon himself by violent or other actively
self-destructive means, as evidenced by behavior causing or attempting
the infliction of serious bodily harm upon himself within twenty days
prior to initiation of the proceeding.
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(24) "Likely to injure others" means that it is more likely than not
that in the near future the person will inflict serious, unjustified bodily
harm on another person, as evidenced by behavior causing, attempting
or threatening such harm, including at least one incident thereof within
twenty days prior to initiation of the proceeding, which behavior gives
rise to reasonable fear of such harm from said person.
(25) "Lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application
on his behalf" means the person's inability, by reason of mental condition, to achieve a rudimentary understanding, after conscientious efforts at explanation of the purpose, nature or possible significant benefits of treatment; provided that a person shall be deemed incapable of
understanding the purpose of treatment if, due to impaired mental ability to perceive reality, he cannot realize that he has recently engaged in
behavior likely to injure himself or others; and provided further than a
person shall be deemed to lack sufficient capacity if his reason for refusing treatment is expressly based on either the belief that he is unworthy of treatment or the desire to destroy, harm or punish himself.
Section 2. Subsection (7) of section 394.457, Florida Statutes, is
amended to read:
394.457 Operation and administration.(7) PAYMENT FOR CARE OF PATIENTS. - Fees and fee collections for patients in treatment facilities shall be according to s.
402.33, except that no person evaluated, detained, committed or
treated involuntarily pursuant to the provisions of this part, or parents
or spouse of the person, or third party payor, shall be required to participate in the costs of pay fees incurred for their evaluation, treatment,
care, maintenance or custody pursuant to this part; provided that if,
upon the patient's request the patient is placed in any private facility,
the patient shall bear the expense of the patient's care, maintenance
and treatment at such facility.
Section 3. Subsections (3)(a) and (9) of section 394.459, Florida Statutes, are amended and subsection (2)(d) is added to said section to
read:
394.459 Rights of patients. (2) RIGHT TO TREATMENT. (d) Not more than 5 days after the beginning of treatment, each
patient shall have and receive an individualized treatment plan in writ-
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ing that the patient has maximum opportunity to assist in preparing.
Each plan shall contain at least:
1. A statement of the specific problems and specific needs of the
patient;
2. A statement of intermediate and long-range objectives, with a
projected timetable for their attainment;
3. A statement and rationale for the plan of treatment for achieving these objectives;
4. A statement of the least restrictive treatment conditions
necesary to achieve the purposes of placement.
5. A specification of treatment staff responsibility and a description of proposed staff involvment with the patient in order to attain the
objectives;
6. Criteria for release to less restrictive treatment conditions;
7. The additional disclosure information required in
s.394.459(3)(a).
(3) RIGHT TO EXPRESS AND INFORMED PATIENT
CONSENT. -

(a) All persons entering a facility shall be asked to give express
and informed consent for treatment after disclosure to the patient if he
is competent, or his guardian if he is a minor or is incompetent, of the
purpose of the treatment to be provided, the common side effects
thereof, alternative treatment modalities, the approximate length of
care, and that consent given by a patient may be revoked orally or in
writing prior to or during the treatment period by the patient or his
guardian. If a voluntary patient refuses to consent to or revokes consent
for treatment, such patient shall be discharged within 3 days or in the
event the patient meets the criteria for involuntary placement, such
proceedings shall be instituted within 3 days. If any patient refuses
treatment and is not discharged as a result, treatment may be rendered
such patient in the least restrictive manner on an emergency basis,
upon the written order of a mental health professional when such
mental health professional determines treatment is necessary for the
safety of the patient or others. Safety is jeopardized only by a situation
threatening death or serious bodily harm. If any patient refuses consented to treatment or revokes consent previously provided, and if, in
the opinion of the patient's mental health professional, the treatment
not consented to is essential to appropriate care for such patient hereunder, then the administrator shall immediately petition the hearing
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examiner for a hearing to determine the competency of the patient to
consent to treatment. If the hearing examiner finds that the patient is
incompetent to consent to treatment, he shall appoint a guardian advocate, who shall act on the patient's behalf relating to provisions of express and informed consent to treatment. A guardian advocate appointed pursuant to the provisions of this act shall meet the
qualifications of a guardian contained in part IV of chapter 744, except
that no mental health professional, department employee, or facility
administrator shall be appointed.
(9) CLINICAL RECORD: CONFIDENTIALITY. A clinical record for each patient shall be maintained. The record
shall include data pertaining to admission and such other information
as may be required under rules of the department. Unless waived by
express and informed consent by the patient or his guardian or attorney, the privileged and confidential status of the clinical record shall
not be lost by either authorized or unauthorized disclosure to any person, organization, or agency. Notwithstanding s. 90.503(4)(b), no communication made by an individual to a mental health professional, including but not limited to a psychotherapist, may be used for any
purpose other than a proceeding under this act. The clinical record
shall not be a public record and no part of it shall be released,
except: . . .
Section 4. Section 394.460, Florida Statutes, is amended and subsection (2) and (3) are added to said section to read:
394.460 Rights of mental health professionals. (1) No mental health professional shall be required to accept patients for treatment of mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders. Such
participation shall be voluntary.
(2) Mental health professionals testifying at hearings conducted
pursuant to this part may, if appropriately qualified, give expert
testimony:
(a) Describing the present mental functioning of a person whom
the witness has personally examined;
(b) Stating an opinion as to what the prospects are that proposed
and available treatment will improve the person's mental condition;
(c) Stating an opinion whether the person has a mental illness, as
defined in s. 394.455(3); provided that any witness so testifying shall
provide a detailed explanation as to how any such descriptions and
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opinions are reached and a specification of all behaviors and other factual information on which such descriptions and opinions were based.
(3) Mental health professionals testifying at such hearings shall
not be permitted to give opinion testimony:
(a) Stating the diagnostic category applicable to a person, unless
the person raises the issue through cross-examination or the presentation of evidence, or
(b) Notwithstanding s. 90.703, stating a conclusion that a person
is likely to injure himself or others, or that a person's neglect or refusal
to care for himself poses a real and present threat of substantial harm
to his well being.
Subsection 5. Subsection (2)(a) of section 394.463, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
304.463 Admission for emergency or evaluation. (2) COURT-ORDERED EVALUATION. (a) Criteria. - A person may be admitted to, or retained in, a receiving facility for evaluation if there is reason to believe that he is
mentally ill and because of his illness is:
1. Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty;
or
2. In need of care or treatment that manifests itself in neglect or
refusal to care for himself, that such neglect or refusal poses a real and
present threat of substantial harm to his well being, and that he lacks
sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application oh his own behalf.
Section 6. Subsections (1)(b), (2)(d), (3)(a), and (4)(f) of section
394.467, Florida Statutes, are amended to read:
394.467 Involuntary placement. (1) CRITERIA.

-

(b) Any other person may be involuntarily placed if he is mentally
ill and, because of his illnes, is:
1. Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty;
or
2. In need of care or treatment that manifests itself in neglect or
refusal to care for himself, that such nelgect or refusal poses a real and
present threat of substantial harm to his well being, and that he lacks
sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application on his own behalf.
(2) ADMISSION TO A TREATMENT FACILITY. (d) A written notice that the patient or his guardian or representa-
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tive may apply immediately to the court to have an attorney appointed
if the patient cannot afford one.
The petition may be filed in the county in which the patient is
involuntarily placed at any time within 6 months of the date of the
certificate. The hearing shall be held in the same county, and one of
the patient's physicians at the facility shall appear as a witness at the
hearing. If the hearing is waived, the court shall order the patient to be
transferred to the least restrictive type of treatment facility based on
the individual needs of the patient, or, if he is at a treatment facility,
that he be retained there. However, the patient can be immediately
transferred to the treatment facility by waiving his hearing without
awaiting the court order. The involuntary placement certificate shall
serve as authorization for the patient to be transferred to a treatment
facility and as authorization for the treatment facility to admit the patient. The treatment facility may retain a patient for a period not to
exceed 6 months from the date of admission if the patient is likely to
injure others or is in need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application on his own behalf, or for a
period not to exceed 2 weeks from the date of admission if the patient
is likely to injure himself. If continued involuntary placement is necessary at the end of that period, the administrator shall apply to the
hearing examiner for an order authorizing not more than one continued
involuntary placement.
(3) PROCEDURE FOR HEARING ON INVOLUNTARY
PLACEMENT. -

(a) If the patient does not waive a hearing or if the patient, his
guardian, or a representative, files a petition for a hearing after having
waived it, the judge shall serve notice on the administrator of the facility in which the patient is placed and on the patient. The notice of
hearing must specify the date, time, and place of hearing; the basis for
detention; and the names of examining mental health professionals and
other persons testifying in support of continued detention and the substance of their proposed testimony. The judge may serve notice on the
state attorney of the judicial circuit of the county in which the patient
is placed, who shall represent the state. The court shall hold the hearing within 5 days unless a continuance is granted. The patient, his
guardian or representative, or the administrator may apply for a
change of venue for the convenience of parties or witnesses or because
of the condition of the patient. Venue may be ordered changed within
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the discretion of the court. The patient and his guardian or representative shall be informed of the right to counsel by the court. If the patient
cannot afford an attorney, the court shall appoint one. The patient's
counsel shall have access to facility records and to facility personnel in
defending the patient. One of the mental health professionals who executed the involuntary placement certificates shall be a witness. The patient and his guardian or representative shall be informed by the judge
of the right to an independent expert examination by a mental health
professional. If the patient cannot afford a mental health professional,
the judge shall appoint one. If the court concludes that the patient
meets the criteria for involuntary placement, the judge shall order that
the patient be transferred to a treatment facility or, if the patient is at
a treatment facility, that he be retained there or that he be treated at
any other appropriate facility or service on an involuntary basis. The
judge shall consider testimony and evidence regarding the patient's
competence to consent to treatment. If the judge finds that the patient
is incompetent to consent to treatment, he shall appoint a guardian advocate who shall act on the patient's behalf relating to the provision of
express and informed consent to treatment. The order shall adequately
document the nature and extent of a patient's mental illness. The judge
may adjudicate a person incompetent pursuant to the provisions of this
act at the hearing on involuntary placement. The treatment facility
may accept and retain a patient admitted involuntarily for a period not
to exceed 3 months if the patient is likely to injure others or is in need
of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable
application on his own behalf, or for a period not to exceed 2 weeks if
the patient is likely to injure himself, whenever the patient is accompanied by a court order and adequate documentation of the patient's
mental illness. Such documentation shall include a psychiatric evaluation and any psychological and social work evaluations of the patient.
If further involuntary placement is necessary at the end of that period,
the administrator shall apply to the hearing examiner for an order authorizing not more than one continued involuntary placement.
(4) PROCEDURE FOR CONTINUED INVOLUNTARY
PLACEMENT. -

(f) If the patient by express and informed consent waives his hearing or if at a hearing it is shown that the patient continues to meet the.
criteria for involuntary placement, and that there is a substantial
probability that treatment will significantly improve the patient's
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mental condition, the hearing officer shall sign the order for continued
involuntary placement. The treatment facility shall be authorized to retain the patient for a period not to exceed 3 months if the patient is
likely to injure others or is in need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application on his own behalf, or
for a period not to exceed 2 weeks if the patient is likely to injure
himself. There shall be no more than one continued involuntary placement period.
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